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One of the most striking features of state constitutional law is
the degree to which it seems interchangeable with federal constitu-
tional law at the doctrinal level. The state and federal enterprises
of constitutional self-government are similar in many ways and
draw to some extent on a common core of American experience and
tradition, so a certain degree of similarity is to be expected. Yet
the doctrinal convergence stamping these bodies of law goes well
beyond the kind of family resemblance that their common ancestry
and purpose might be expected to produce. Instead, state courts
frequently rely heavily on federal decisions, overtly appropriate
federal standards and analyses, and, in general, approach the ad-
judication of questions arising under the state constitution with an
attitude of profound dependence on the work of federal tribunals-
an approach that has been widely condemned in the academic com-
munity' and has been rejected in principle by the loose movement
* Professor of Law, Western New England College School of Law. My
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1. See, e.g., Ronald K.L. Collins, Reliance on State Constitutions-Away
From a Reactionary Approach, 9 Hastings Coast. L.Q. 1, 2-3 (1981); George
Deukmejian & Clifford K. Thompson, Jr., All Sail and No Anchor-Judicial Re-
view Under the California Constitution, 6 Hastings Coast. L.Q. 975 (1979); Peter J.
Galie, The Other Supreme Courts: Judicial Activism Among State Supreme Courts,
33 Syracuse L. Rev. 731, 779, 786 (1982); Ken Gormley, Ten Adventures in State
Constitutional Law, in 1 Emerging Issues in State Constitutional Law 29, 35
(1988); A.E. Dick Howard, The Renaissance of State Constitutional Law, in 1
Emerging Issues in State Constitutional Law, supra, at 1, 12-13; Paul S. Hudnut,
State Constitutions and Individual Rights: The Case for Judicial Restraint, 63
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of scholars and judges sometimes known as the New Judicial
Federalism. 2
My purpose in this paper is neither to praise nor condemn this
doctrinal congruity or the approach to state constitutional adjudi-
cation that produces it, but to offer an explanation. My thesis, in
brief, is this: the widespread convergence of state and federal con-
stitutional doctrine can be explained in part as the natural contin-
uation of a long, powerful tradition on the state level of
constitutional universalism-the belief that all American constitu-
tions are drawn from the same set of universal principles of justice
and good government.
I. DOCTRINAL CONVERGENCE IN SEPARATION OF POWERS
JURISPRUDENCE
The doctrinal similarity of state and federal constitutional law
has been most often remarked in the area of individual rights. It
was, after all, concern over the United States Supreme Court's
treatment of individual rights during the early 1970s that
prompted Justice Brennan to issue his now-famous call to state
courts to use state constitutions as sources of heightened protec-
tion for individual rights,3 an invitation that more than any other
single event gave birth to the New Judicial Federalism. Although
some courts have occasionally heeded the call, most have not; doc-
trinal convergence is still the rule when it comes to the protection
of constitutional liberties. 4
Denv. U. L. Rev. 85, 95 (1985); Judith S. Kaye, Dual Constitutionalism in Practice
and Principle, 61 St. John's L. Rev. 399, 417-18 (1987); Robin B. Johansen, Note,
The New Federalism: Toward a Principled Interpretation of the State Constitution,
29 Stan. L. Rev. 297, 300 (1977).
2. For a historical overview of the development of this movement, see James
A. Gardner, The Failed Discourse of State Constitutionalism, 90 Mich. L. Rev. 761,
771-77 (1992); G. Alan Taff, The New Judicial Federalism in Perspective, 72 Notre
Dame L. Rev. 1097 (1997). Numerous recent symposia have been devoted to the
topic. For a recent example, see Symposium, The New Judicial Federalism: A New
Generation, 30 Val. U. L. Rev. 421 (1996).
3. See William J. Brennan, Jr., State Constitutions and the Protection of Indi-
vidual Rights, 90 Harv. L. Rev. 489 (1977).
4. See Barry Latzer, State Constitutions and Criminal Justice 158 (1991);
Gardner, supra note 2, at 788-93; Michael E. Solimine & James L. Walker, Feder-
alism, Liberty and State Constitutional Law, 23 Ohio N.U. L. Rev. 1457, 1467 &
nn.68-70 (1997).
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Less often remarked is the equally pronounced tendency to-
ward doctrinal convergence in other substantive areas of constitu-
tional law, including structural areas such as the separation of
powers. For example, just within the last fifteen years courts in at
least eight states have issued major separation of powers rulings
relying extensively on federal authority.5 Some flavor for the de-
gree of this reliance can be gleaned from the recent decision of the
New Jersey Court of Appeals in In the Matter of the Adoption of
Regulations Governing the State Health Plan.6 In that case, the
court upheld a state law against a challenge that the legislature
had delegated excessive authority to the New Jersey Department
of Health.7 In analyzing the separation of powers under the New
Jersey Constitution, the court relied heavily on major decisions of
the United States Supreme Court construing the federal Constitu-
tion8 - and, strangely, Professor Kenneth Culp Davis's leading
treatise on administrative law9 - a work that addresses federal
administrative law almost exclusively. 10
During the same period, courts in at least six states have gone
beyond mere reliance to outright adoption of federal separation of
powers doctrine for purposes of fashioning a rule of decision for
separation of powers cases arising under the state constitution.11
For example, a 1984 decision of the Connecticut Supreme Court
5. See Paisner v. Attorney General, 458 N.E.2d 734 (Mass. 1983); People v.
Raihala, 502 N.W.2d 755 (Mich. Ct. App. 1993); State v. Di Frisco, 571 A.2d 914
(N.J. 1990); Under 21 v. City of New York, 482 N.E.2d 1 (N.Y. 1985); Common-
wealth v. Jubelirer, 567 A.2d 741 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1989); In re House of Repre-
sentatives, 575 A.2d 176 (R.I. 1990); State v. De La Cruz, 393 S.E.2d 184 (S.C.
1990); Carrick v. Locke, 882 P.2d 173 (Wash. 1994).
6. 621 A.2d 484 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1993).
7. See id. at 492-93.
8. See id. at 488 (citing Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361 (1989); INS
v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983); Panama Ref. Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388 (1935);
Schecter Poultry Co. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935)).
9. See id. (citing Kenneth Culp Davis, 1 Administrative Law Treatise § 2:4,
at 71-72 (2d ed. 1978)).
10. In five volumes, Davis devotes a total of sixteen pages to state administra-
tive procedure acts. Davis, supra note 9, §§ 1:10-1:11, at 36-51. The New Jersey
court did not even cite to these pages. See Adoption of Regulations, 621 A.2d at
488.
11. See Pellegrino v. O'Neill, 480 A.2d 476, 481-83 (Conn. 1984); Department
of Transp. v. Armacost, 532 A.2d 1056, 1062-65 (Md. 1987); Commonwealth v. Ses-
soms, 532 A.2d 775, 778-79 (Pa. 1987); In re Advisory from the Governor, 633 A.2d
664, 674-75 (R.I. 1993); Common Cause of W. Va. v. Tomblin, 413 S.E.2d 358, 360-
61, 364 (W. Va. 1991); Billis v. State, 800 P.2d 401, 413-15 (Wyo. 1990).
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adopted the federal political question doctrine, a doctrine holding
that Article III of the United States Constitution limits the power
of federal courts to adjudicate certain kinds of disputes. 12 The
Connecticut court applied the political question doctrine to con-
clude that Connecticut courts lacked authority under the state con-
stitution to adjudicate the constitutionality of legislative
appropriations decisions relating to funding for the judicial
branch. 13 In a 1993 opinion, the Rhode Island Supreme Court
adopted the majority opinion in INS v. Chadha14 in the course of
upholding revolving-door restrictions on state employment. 15 Con-
versely, in 1991, the West Virginia Supreme Court adopted Justice
White's dissenting opinion in Chadha to decide the validity under
the state constitution of a statute requiring prosecutorial consent
to the judicial practice of deferring criminal proceedings and plac-
ing defendants on probation without entering judgment of
conviction.' 6
Some recent state rulings have gone even further. In these
cases, courts have gone beyond mere reliance on federal authority
or appropriation of federal doctrine to hold that the doctrinal prin-
ciples of separation of powers form a common body of shared law
upon which the state and federal constitutions independently
draw. For example, in an opinion tracing separation of powers
principles to thinkers such as Montesquieu and Locke, the Florida
Supreme Court recently said: "The principles underlying the gov-
ernmental separation of powers antedate our Florida Constitution
and were collectively adopted by the union of states in our federal
12. See Pellegrino, 480 A.2d at 481-83; see also State ex rel. Oberly v. Troise,
526 A.2d 898, 904-05 (Del. 1987) (citing Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 210, 217
(1962) to determine if a nonjusticiable political question exists); Trustees of Ha-
waiian Affairs v. Yamasaki, 737 P.2d 446, 455-57 (Haw. 1987) (deferring to United
States Supreme Court precedents when political questions are involved); Kluk v.
Lang, 531 N.E.2d 790, 796-97 (Ill. 1988) (relying on the Baker v. Carr political
question test to deny a challenge to a declaratory judgment based on the political
question exception). Earlier cases are collected in Nat Stern, The Political Ques-
tion Doctrine in State Courts, 35 S.C. L. Rev. 405, 408-23 (1984).
13. See Pellegrino, 480 A.2d at 481-82.
14. 462 U.S. 919 (1983).
15. See In re Advisory from the Governor, 633 A.2d at 674-75 (citing Chadha v.
INS, 634 F.2d 408 (9th Cir. 1980), af/d, 462 U.S. 919 (1983)).
16. See Common Cause of W. Va., 413 S.E.2d at 363-64 (quoting Chadha, 462
U.S. at 967-68 (White, J., dissenting)).
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constitution."17 The Maryland Court of Appeals has reached a
similar conclusion:
The delegation doctrine... is a corollary of the separation of
powers doctrine which underlies both the Maryland and Fed-
eral Constitutions. Steeped in the political theories of Mon-
tesquieu and Locke, those who framed the constitutions of
our states and of the federal government believed that sepa-
rating the functions of government ... was fundamental to
good government and the preservation of civil liberties.18
The Kansas Supreme Court has described the separation of powers
as a feature of "the American constitutional system"l 9-as though
the court were somehow called upon to construe such a thing
rather than "the Kansas constitutional system" or "the United
States constitutional system."
Probably the most extreme kind of doctrinal convergence in
this area can be found in the recent decision of the Hawaii
Supreme Court in State v. Bernades.20 There, a criminal defend-
ant challenged state sentencing guidelines as a violation of the Ha-
waii Constitution's separation of powers. 21 In rejecting that
challenge, the Hawaii Supreme Court ruled that the guidelines did
not violate "the separation of powers doctrine under the Hawaii
and United States Constitutions"22-as though the federal Consti-
tution actually controlled the outcome, an obvious error as a mat-
ter of positive law.
One reason why this doctrinal congruity seems striking is that
it is so unexpected. The appeal of congruity in the area of individ-
ual rights is easy to understand. Constitutionally protected indi-
vidual rights are often said to be fundamental 23 or to arise from
universal principles of justice, human nature or natural law. 24
Where liberties protected by the United States Constitution are
understood to rest on such impressive foundations, it is surely
17. Chiles v. Children A, B, C, D, E, and F, 589 So. 2d 260, 263 (Fla. 1991)
(citing Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 380 (1989)).
18. Department of Transp. v. Armacost, 532 A.2d 1056, 1062 (Md. 1987).
19. State ex rel. Stephan v. Kansas House of Representatives, 687 P.2d 622,
634 (Kan. 1984).
20. 795 P.2d 842 (Haw. 1990).
21. See id. at 843.
22. Id. at 845 (emphasis added).
23. See Ira C. Lupu, Untangling the Strands of the Fourteenth Amendment, 77
Mich. L. Rev. 981 (1979).
24. See infra Section II.
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tempting to assume that facially similar provisions of state consti-
tutions share this derivation and should be similarly interpreted.
The structural details of the separation of powers, however, do not
typically purport to rest on fundamental or universal principles.
Unlike the God-given "unalienable rights" mentioned in the Decla-
ration of Independence, 25 the separation of governmental powers is
usually understood to be a means of protecting liberty rather than
a liberty itself entitled to constitutional protection. I will show be-
low that the belief in the universality of constitutional principles
reached its zenith during the middle and late nineteenth century.
Yet even one of the most influential jurists of that period, Massa-
chusetts Chief Justice Lemuel Shaw, himself a strong believer in
the universality of constitutional principles, did not consider the
constitutional separation of powers to reflect any fundamental
principle of constitutional law. As he wrote in 1849: "The proper
province of a declaration of rights and constitution of government,
after directing its form, regulating its organization and the distri-
bution of its powers, is to declare great principles and fundamental
truths."26 Shaw thus excluded the distribution of powers from the
constitution's declaration of fundamental principles. 27
State courts' enthusiasm for relying on and appropriating fed-
eral decisional law concerning the separation of powers is also sur-
prising given the many differences between the state and federal
constitutions in this area. For example, unlike the United States
Constitution, some state constitutions have provisions specifically
addressing the separation of powers that might suggest the need
for a different approach.28 State constitutions also frequently dif-
25. The Declaration of Independence para. 2 (U.S. 1776).
26. Roberts v. City of Boston, 59 Mass. (5 Cush.) 198, 206 (1849) (emphasis
added).
27. Professor Sherry has argued that courts of this period tended to consult
natural law in cases dealing with individual rights, but not in cases dealing with
structural issues such as the separation of powers. See Suzanna Sherry, The
Founders' Unwritten Constitution, 54 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1127, 1132-33, 1167-70
(1987). This conclusion, with which I generally agree, in no way impugns my con-
tention that state courts interpreting structural aspects of state constitutions bor-
rowed indiscriminately from federal decisions and from each other, even during
this early period. See, e.g., G. & D. Taylor & Co. v. R.G. & J.T. Place, 4 R.I. 324
(1856) (relying heavily on federal separation of powers decisions as an aid to decid-
ing the constitutionality of the state legislature's setting aside of a civil jury ver-
dict and ordering a new trial).
28. For example, the Rhode Island Constitution provides: "The powers of the
government shall be distributed into three departments: the legislative, executive
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fer structurally from the federal Constitution. All but four states
provide for independent popular election of lower executive branch
officials such as the state's attorney general or chief financial of-
ficer,29 and many provide for popular election to numerous execu-
tive offices, up to as many as ten.30 The independent election of
these officials gives them an autonomy that lower executive branch
officials of the United States lack, thereby removing from the gov-
ernor significant powers that the President of the United States
retains. In addition, the constitutions of 41 states provide for pop-
ular election of at least some state judges, diminishing their inde-
pendence but increasing their accountability in ways unknown
under the federal system.31 These differences surely have ramifi-
cations for the precise ways in which the balance of power among
the branches of government ought to be struck, yet they are almost
universally ignored in judicial analyses of the separation of powers
under state constitutions.
Many other differences between the state and federal constitu-
tions might also be relevant to a separation of powers analysis.
State power under state constitutions is generally understood to be
and judicial." R.I. Const. art. V. Courts in some states that have such provisions
have interpreted them to require a stricter separation of powers than does the
United States Constitution. See Alexander v. State, 441 So. 2d 1329, 1335 (Miss.
1983). Others have not attached great significance to such language. See Depart-
ment of Transp. v. Armacost, 532 A.2d 1056, 1064-65 (Md. 1987).
29. See Council of State Governments, The Book of the States 33-34 tbl. 2.9
(1996-97). The exceptions are Maine, New Hampshire, New Jersey and Tennes-
see. See id.
30. See, e.g, id. at 33. In North Carolina and North Dakota the Governor,
Lieutenant Governor, Secretary of State, Attorney General, Treasurer, Auditor,
and Commissioners of Education, Agriculture, Labor and Insurance are all elected.
See id.
31. See Ala. Const. art. VI, § 152; Alaska Const. art. IV, § 6; Ariz. Const. art.
VI, § 12; Ark. Const. art. VII, §§ 6, 17; Cal. Const. art. VI, § 16; Colo. Const. art. VI,
§ 25; Conn. Const. art. V, § 2; Fla. Const. art. V, § 10; Ga. Const. art. VI, § 7, para.
1; Idaho Const. art. V, § 6; Ill. Const. art. VI, § 12(a); Ind. Const. art. VII, § 11;
Iowa Const. art, V, § 17; Kan. Const. art. III, §§ 5(a), 6(a); Ky. Const. § 117; La.
Const. art. V, § 22(A); Me. Const. art. VI, § 6; Md. Const. art. IV, § 3; Mich. Const.
art. VI, §§ 2, 8, 12; Minn. Const. art. VI, § 7; Miss. Const. art. VI, § 145; Mo. Const.
art. V, § 16; Mont. Const. art. VII, § 8(1); Neb. Const. art. V, § 21(3); Nev. Const.
art. VI, § 3; N.M. Const. art. VI, §§ 4, 10, 14, 16 (amended Nov. 8, 1988); N.Y.
Const. art. VI, §§ 6(c), 10(a); N.C. Const. art. IV, § 9(1); N.D. Const. art. VI, § 7;
Ohio Const. art. IV, § 6(A)(1)-(4); Okla. Const. art. VII, § 3; Or. Const. art. VII, § 2;
S.D. Const. art. V, § 7; Tenn. Const. art. VI, § 3; Tex. Const. art. V, § 2; Utah
Const. art. VIII, § 9; Vt. Const. ch. II, § 50; Wash. Const. art. IV, § 3; W. Va. Const.
art. VIII, §§ 2, 5; Wis. Const. art. VII, § 4(1); Wyo. Const. art. V, § 4(g).
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plenary except as limited, while power under the United States
Constitution is withheld except as specifically granted. 32 This
might provide the state legislature with an advantage in inter-
branch disputes that on the federal level Congress would be unable
to claim. Conversely, governors often have an item veto, increas-
ing gubernatorial power in comparison to presidential power.33
State legislatures are also typically less professionalized than Con-
gress and have fewer resources, 34 potentially giving the governor
another advantage as compared to the President. Local traditions,
such as Rhode Island's tradition of legislative appointment to the
executive and judicial branches, 35 might also be relevant to the
analysis of separation of powers under the state constitution. Fi-
nally, the fact that federal separation of powers doctrine, unlike
the federal analysis of individual rights incorporated through the
Fourteenth Amendment, provides no binding "floor" to the distri-
bution of powers under the state constitution, might also make the
federal analyses less directly relevant.36
Given the many strong reasons for expecting state separation
of powers analysis to proceed independently of its federal counter-
part, what can account for the striking record of heavy and wide-
spread state court reliance on federal separation of powers
32. This principle was established comparatively early in the history of Amer-
ican constitutional adjudication. Compare McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4
Wheat.) 316, 404 (1819) (holding that the U.S. Constitution grants the government
only enumerated powers), with Pratt v. Allen, 13 Conn. 119, 124-25 (1839) (distin-
guishing between the limited powers conferred to the federal government and the
extensive powers of state government).
33. See Richard Briffault, The Item Veto in State Courts, 66 Temp. L. Rev.
1171 (1993).
34. See Rogan Kersh et al, "More a Distinction of Words than Things: The
Evolution of Separated Powers in the American States, 4 Roger Williams U. L. Rev.
5 (1998).
35. See Richard A. Hogarty, When Legislators Become Administrators: The
Problem of Plural Office-Holding, 4 Roger Williams U. L. Rev. 133 (1998); Sheldon
Whitehouse, Appointments by the Legislature Under the Rhode Island Separation
of Powers Doctrine: The Hazards of the Road Less Traveled, 1 Roger Williams U. L.
Rev. 1, 19-23 (1996).
36. For a more complete discussion of the potentially analytically relevant dif-
ferences, see John Devlin, Toward a State Constitutional Analysis of Allocation of
Powers: Legislators and Legislative Appointees Performing Administrative Func-
tions, 66 Temp. L. Rev. 1205 (1993). See also Hon. Ellen A. Peters, Getting Away
from the Federal Paradigm: Separation of Powers in State Courts, 81 Minn. L. Rev.
1543, 1548 (1997) (identifying three major sources of differences between state and
federal courts).
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decisions, standards and analyses? In my view, much can be
learned from an examination of a frequently overlooked aspect of
the history of state constitutionalism: a long and powerful tradi-
tion of "American constitutional universalism."
II. AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL UNIVERSALISM
Constitutional universalism, as I use the term here, refers to
the belief that all American constitutions are drawn from the same
set of universal principles of constitutional self-governance. In
constitutional adjudication, this belief typically manifests itself in
at least one of three ways. First, universalist premises may mani-
fest themselves in a lack of judicial attention to or discussion of the
constitutional text, case authority, framers' intent, or relevant his-
tory including history specific to the provision under review.37 Sec-
ond, when courts rely on authority, its use is characterized by
indiscriminate borrowing from other jurisdictions, whether federal
or state, and from the common law. The third and most obvious
manifestation of constitutional universalism, although today the
rarest, is overt reliance on either natural law or so-called "general
principles" of law.
With these concepts in mind, I turn now to a very brief over-
view of the career of constitutional universalism on the state and
federal levels. An examination of this history shows that univer-
salism has been largely overthrown in the federal courts by a posi-
tivist revolution that took hold in the early part of this century.
However, on the state level, constitutional universalism's roots are
much deeper and stronger, and the forces of positivism have not
yet succeeded in dislodging them.
A. Legal Universalism in the Federal Courts
The early history of legal universalism in the federal courts is
reasonably well known. One of the earliest hints of universalism
can be found in the famous debate between Justices Chase and Ire-
dell in Calder v. Bull 38 about the propriety of recognizing natural
law as a judicially cognizable restraint on legislative power that
37. See Gardner, supra note 2, at 780-94 (providing a more thorough discus-
sion and documentation of these adjudicatory practices in state constitutional deci-
sion-making).
38. 3 U.S. (3 Dali.) 386 (1798).
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exists independent of any limitations written into constitutions.
Another early bow toward universalism appears in Fletcher v.
Peck,39 where Justice Marshall wrote: "It may well be doubted
whether the nature of society and of government does not prescribe
some limits to the legislative power .... [States are restrained]
either by general principles which are common to our free institu-
tions, or by the particular provisions of the Constitution of the
United States."40
In the federal courts, however, legal universalism came into
full flower with the Supreme Court's 1842 decision in Swift v. Ty-
son.4 1 In Swift, a commercial dispute arising under New York law,
the Supreme Court rejected the authority of state courts to declare
state law authoritatively for purposes of furnishing rules for fed-
eral courts to apply in diversity suits. 42 The Court went on to hold
that the New York courts had misconstrued "general principles" of
commercial law. 43 Rather than apply the New York courts' misin-
terpretation of this law, the Court identified the "correct" rule and
proceeded to apply it to the facts. 4
The federal trend toward universalism reached its peak dur-
ing the 1860s and 1870s in a set of now obscure rulings concerning
municipal bonds.45 In Gelpcke v. City of Dubuque," decided in
1864, the Court was required in a diversity suit to rule upon the
validity of a set of bonds issued by the city of Dubuque, Iowa to
finance the construction of railroad lines. 47 The Iowa Constitution
then in force contained provisions that raised some question about
the constitutionality of such a municipal investment.48 In several
earlier cases the Iowa courts had not construed the state constitu-
tion to prohibit the issuance of these kinds of bonds, but in 1862
39. 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87 (1810).
40. Id. at 135-39.
41. 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842).
42. Id. at 18-19.
43. Id. at 19.
44. See id. at 19-22.
45. For an extremely thorough and informative discussion of these cases and
their historical context, see Charles Fairman, 1 Reconstruction and Reunion 1864-
88 chs. 17-18 (1971).
46. 68 U.S. (1 Wall.) 175 (1864).
47. The intense competition among towns for access to rail lines is detailed in
Fairman, supra note 45, at ch. 17.
48. See Gelpcke, 68 U.S. (1 Wall.) at 204 (quoting Iowa Const. art. I, § 6; art.
III, § 1; art. VII; art. VIII, § 2).
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the Iowa Supreme Court reversed itself and held that the Iowa
Constitution prohibited the taxation of citizens for purposes of aid-
ing a railroad. 49 The United States Supreme Court refused to fol-
low this ruling.50 "It cannot be," the Justices said, "that this court
will follow every.., oscillation" in the rulings of state tribunals. 5 '
The earlier decisions, we think, are sustained by reason and
authority. They are in harmony with the adjudications of six-
teen States of the Union. Many of the cases in the other
States are marked by the profoundest legal ability.
The late case in Iowa, and two other cases of a kindred
character in another State, also overruling earlier adjudica-
tions, stand out, as far as we are advised, in unenviable soli-
tude and notoriety.52
Consequently, the Court declined to follow the Iowa Supreme
Court's construction of the Iowa Constitution, and applied instead
an opposite rule which, the Court observed, "rests upon the plain-
est principles of justice."53 The Court made a bow toward "the im-
portance of uniformity in the decisions of this court, and those of
the highest local courts, giving constructions to the laws and con-
stitutions of their own States."54 But, said the Court, from time to
time "exceptional cases" arise.55 In such cases, "[wie shall never
immolate truth, justice, and the law, because a State tribunal has
erected the altar and decreed the sacrifice."56
The Court reached a similar result eight years later in Olcott
v. The Supervisors,57 a case involving notes issued by a Wisconsin
county for railroad improvements. In an earlier case, the Wiscon-
sin Supreme Court had ruled this practice unconstitutional on the
ground that it was not a "public purpose" within the meaning of
the Wisconsin Constitution.58 When the same issue reached the
United States Supreme Court in a diversity case, it refused to fol-
49. See id. at 205 (citing State of Iowa ex rel. Burlington & Missouri R.R. Co.
v. County of Wapello, 13 Iowa 388 (1862)).
50. See id.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 205-06.
53. Id. at 206.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 206-07.
57. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 678 (1872).
58. Id. at 679-81 (citing Whiting v. Sheboygan & Fond du Lac R.R. Co., 25
Wis. 167, 188 (1870)).
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low the Wisconsin court's ruling. "The nature of taxation," the
Court held, "what uses are public and what are private, and the
extent of unrestricted legislative power, are matters which... no
State court can conclusively determine for us."5 9
This trend culminated in Township of Pine Grove v. Talcott,60
a nearly identical case from Michigan decided the following year.
Once again, the Michigan Supreme Court had ruled-ironically, as
will soon be seen, in an opinion written by Justice Thomas Coo-
ley-that taxation for assisting the construction of railroads was
not a public purpose and was thus barred by the state constitu-
tion.61 When the issue reached the United States Supreme Court
in a subsequent diversity case, the Court went well beyond its
prior rulings; here, the Court conducted an independent review of
the Michigan Constitution and rejected the Michigan Supreme
Court's interpretation of it.62 In an interesting reversal of the con-
temporary practice by which state courts occasionally adopt a dis-
sent from a federal case, the Supreme Court decided to adopt the
dissent from a state case: "[wlith all respect for the eminent tribu-
nal by which the judgments were pronounced, we must be permit-
ted to say that they are not satisfactory to our minds. We think
the dissenting opinion in [Salem] is unanswered."63
Of course, unlike the contemporary practice, in which state
courts adopt decisions of the Supreme Court construing a different
constitution, the Court in Pine Grove adopted a dissenting view in
the course of construing the same constitution-the state constitu-
tion. The Court went on to observe that twenty-one other states
permitted such laws, and that the question before it "belongs to the
domain of general jurisprudence," a class of cases in which "this
court is not bound by the judgment of the courts of the States
where the cases arise."64
From here, we arrive once again at familiar territory. The uni-
versalist trend was broadened and solidified in the area of federal
59. Id. at 690.
60. 86 U.S. (19 Wall.) 666 (1873).
61. See id. at 668 (citing People ex rel. Detroit & Howell R.R. Co. v. Township
Bd. of Salem, 20 Mich. 452 (1870)). For an account of the importance of this deci-
sion in Cooley's career, see Alan R. Jones, The Constitutional Conservatism of
Thomas McIntyre Cooley 172-84 (1987).
62. See Township of Pine Grove, 86 U.S. (19 Wall.) at 673-77.
63. Id. at 677.
64. Id.
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constitutional law during the Lochner65 era of substantive due pro-
cess decisions. During this period, which lasted roughly from the
1890s well into the 1930s, the Court's due process jurisprudence
was often built around two characteristic features of universalism:
heavy borrowing from the common law for purposes of establishing
constitutional rules of decision; 66 and reliance on broad, extremely
general and mostly unsubstantiated statements about the law,
often accompanied by a noticeable lack of deference toward the
legislature.67
In the federal courts, the universalist approach was eventually
overthrown by a kind of positivist revolution. By "positivist," I
mean the Austinian notion that law, far from being some body of
general principles upon which courts and legislators draw, is bet-
ter understood as the specific commands of specific sovereigns.68
In the area of ordinary law, this positivist revolution occurred es-
sentially with a single stroke: the Supreme Court's 1938 decision
in Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins.69 There, the Court overruled
Swift v. Tyson and held that state courts are authoritative and fi-
65. See Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905). Lochner is often used as a
shorthand way of referring to a period of the Supreme Court's due process juris-
prudence. See, e.g., Cass Sunstein, Lochner's Legacy, 87 Colum. L. Rev. 873
(1987).
66. See Sunstein, supra note 65, at 879, 882, 885, 903-04.
67. Professor Sherry describes the Lochner era as a "brief flirtation[ ] with
decisionmaking on the basis of natural law," a practice she views as having all but
disappeared from United States Supreme Court jurisprudence by the 1820s.
Sherry, supra note 27, at 1176 & n.221.
68. See John Austin, The Province of Jurisprudence Determined (1832); Ste-
phen M. Feldman, From Premodern to Modern American Jurisprudence: The Onset
of Positivism, 50 Vand. L. Rev, 1387 (1997). The distinction between positivism
and universalism may be a good deal less clear than we are ordinarily inclined to
think:
Law shows us many paradoxes. Perhaps the strangest of all is that, on
the one hand, a people's law can be regarded as being special to it, indeed
a sign of that people's identity, and it is in fact remarkable how different
in important detail even two closely related systems might be; on the
other hand, legal transplants-the moving of a rule or a system of law
from one country to another, or from one people to another-have been
common since the earliest recorded history.
Alan Watson, Legal Transplants 21 (1974). This kind of borrowing in a positivist
system may thus mimic universalism in ways that blur the distinctions between
the two regimes.
69. 304 U.S. 64 (1938). It has been suggested that the speed of this revolution
is deceptive in that it represented merely the final ratification of a slowly evolving
Kuhnian paradigm shift. See William R. Casto, The Erie Doctrine and the Struc-
ture of Constitutional Revolutions, 62 Tul. L. Rev. 907 (1988).
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nal interpreters of state law.70 After Erie, federal courts were no
longer permitted to reach independent judgments about the con-
tent of state law. The only permissible ground upon which federal
courts could ignore or set aside state law was that it violated some
provision of the United States Constitution or federal law applica-
ble by virtue of the Supremacy Clause. 71
The parallel move to positivism in federal constitutional law
has been a bit slower in coming. Evidence of this shift can be found
in the intense reaction against Lochner, and in the embrace of tex-
tualism and originalism exemplified by their leading contemporary
practitioners, Justices Scalia and Thomas. However, universal-
ism, especially in the area of substantive due process, has exer-
cised a continuing appeal, particularly in the hands of influential
recent practitioners such as Justices Douglas and Brennan.
B. State Constitutional Universalism
As strong as it was on the federal level during the nineteenth
century, constitutional universalism was far more powerful, per-
sistent and explicit on the state level than it was in the federal
courts. Of no period was this more true than the period preceding
the Civil War. One of the most vivid examples of state constitu-
tional universalism is the 1852 decision of the Georgia Supreme
Court in Campbell v. State.7 2 In Campbell, a criminal defendant
convicted of manslaughter challenged his conviction on the ground
that admission into evidence of the dying declaration of the victim
violated his right to confront witnesses under the Sixth Amend-
ment of the United States Constitution.73 The Georgia Constitu-
tion then in effect contained no equivalent provision. 74 The state
argued, logically enough, that the federal Bill of Rights did not re-
strain state power-a point settled by the United States Supreme
Court nineteen years earlier 75-and that in the absence of any
binding constitutional restriction the state was free to do as it
pleased. 76
70. See Erie R.R. Co., 304 U.S. at 77-80.
71. U.S. Const. art. VI.
72. 11 Ga. 353 (1852).
73. See id. at 364.
74. See Ga. Const. of 1798.
75. See Barron v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243
(1833).
76. See Campbell, 11 Ga. at 364-65.
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The Georgia Supreme Court rejected this argument. Accord-
ing to the court, the question was not whether the amendments in
the federal Bill of Rights "were intended to operate as a restriction
upon the government of the United States, but whether it is com-
petent for a State Legislature... to pass an Act directly impairing
the great principles of protection to person and property, embraced
in these amendments?"77 The court continued:
That the power to pass any law infringing on these prin-
ciples is taken from the Federal Government, no one denies.
But is it a part of the reserved rights of a State to do this?
May the Legislature of a State, for example, unless restrained
by its own Constitution, pass a law "respecting an establish-
ment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or
abridging the freedom of speech or of the press... ?" If so, of
what avail ... is the negation of these powers to the General
Government? . . . Now, the doctrine is [argued], that Con-
gress may not exercise this power, but that each State Legis-
lature may do so for itself. As if a National religion and State
religion, a National press and State press, were quite sepa-
rate and distinct from each other; and that the one might be
subject to control, but the other not!78
Any such doctrine, the court concludes, is to be rejected because
notwithstanding we may have different governments, a na-
tion within a nation, imperium in imperio, we have but one
people;.., it is in [vain] to shield them from a blow aimed by
the Federal arm, if they are liable to be prostrated by one
dealt with equal fatality by their own [state]. 79
The federal Bill of Rights, then, is not merely a restraint on
federal power; its purpose was "to declare to the world the fixed
and unalterable determination of our people, that these invaluable
rights ... should never be disturbed by any government."80 The
Bill of Rights thus does not merely establish positive restrictions
on the national government but rather acknowledges "that inde-
pendently of written constitutions, there are restrictions upon the
legislative power, growing out of the nature of the civil compact
and the natural rights of man."8 ' It is these underlying principles,
77. Id. at 365.
73. Id. at 365-66.
79. Id. at 366.
80. Id. at 367.
81. Id. at 369.
124 ROGER WILLIAMS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 4:109
principles shared in common by all Americans, that "constitute a
limit to all legislative power, Federal or State, beyond which it can-
not go."8 2
A similar approach was taken by the Arkansas Supreme
Court. In one of its earliest cases, the court characterized the con-
stitutions of the states as "so many bills of rights, declaratory of
the great and essential principles of civil and political justice."8 3
The court soon made good on this proposition in its 1853 decision
in Ex parte Martin. 4 There, the court struck down a state law
providing for reclamation of swampland and levee construction be-
cause the law failed to compensate landowners. "The constitution
of this state," the court conceded, "contains no provisions that pri-
vate property shall not be taken for public use, without just com-
pensation."8 5 Nevertheless, the court continued, "[tihe duty of
making compensation may be regarded as a law of natural justice,
which has its sanction in every man's sense of right, and is recog-
nized in the most arbitrary of governments."8 6 New York's highest
court reached a similar conclusion in 1835: "It is now considered an
universal and fundamental proposition, in every well regulated
and properly administered government, whether embodied in a
constitutional form or not, that private property cannot be taken
for strictly private purposes at all, nor for public without a just
compensation."8 7
In another case displaying universalist tendencies, the Ten-
nessee Supreme Court in 1831 invalidated a state law having a
"retrospective effect." Although nothing in the state constitution
barred such laws, the court set out various principles of English
common law, and ruled that these common law principles governed
the case because they were "eternal principles of justice which no
government has a right to disregard."88 The legislature, the court
concluded, is not free to do everything not forbidden by the state
82. Id. at 372.
83. State v. Ashley, 1 Ark. 513, 538 (1839), see also Ex parte Allis, 12 Ark.
101, 105 (1851) (ruling that the state constitution must be interpreted "in connec-
tion with known political truths"); Gibson v. City of Pulaski, 2 Ark. 309 (1840)
(invalidating a tax on the keeping of stallions as violating a "common right").
84. 13 Ark. 198 (1853).
85. Id. at 206.
86. Id.
87. People v. Morris, 13 Wend. 325, 328 (N.Y. 1835).
88. Bank of the State v. Cooper, 10 Tenn. 599, 603 (1831) (opinion of Green, J.)
(emphasis added).
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constitution: "some acts, although not expressly forbidden, may be
against the plain and obvious dictates of reason."s9 The Connecti-
cut Supreme Court had independently reached just this conclusion
in 1822: "It is universally admitted," the court held in an opinion
by Chief Justice Hosmer, "and unsusceptible of dispute, that there
may be retrospective laws impairing vested rights, which are un-
just, neither according with sound legislation, nor the fundamental
principles of the social compact."90 But, wrote the Chief Justice,
"[wlith those judges who assert the omnipotence of the legislature,
in all cases, where the constitution has not interposed an explicit
restraint, I cannot agree .... I could not avoid considering it as a
violation of the social compact."91
Massachusetts Chief Justice Lemuel Shaw may well have
summed up this point of view when he wrote in an 1857 case:
In considering constitutional provisions, especially those em-
braced in the Declaration of Rights, and the amendments of
the Constitution of the United States, in the nature of a bill of
rights, we are rather to regard them as the annunciation of
great and fundamental principles, . . . than as precise and
positive directions and rules of action .... Many of them are
so obviously dictated by natural justice and common sense,
and would be so plainly obligatory upon the consciences of
legislators and judges, without any express declaration, that
some of the framers of state constitutions, and even the con-
vention which formed the Constitution of the United States,
did not originally prefix a declaration of rights.92
89. Id. (emphasis added); see also Jeffers v. Fair, 33 Ga. 347, 365-66 (1862)
("There are certain first principles which underlie all governments and all organ-
ized society, the violation of which the framers of governments are not supposed to
intend.").
90. Town of Goshen v. Town of Stonington, 4 Conn. 209, 221 (1822).
91. Id. at 225.
92. Jones v. Robbins, 74 Mass. (8 Gray) 329, 340 (1857). Other courts else-
where in New England held similar views. For example, the New Hampshire
Supreme Judicial Court held that the state constitution's explicit prohibition of
retrospective laws "is but an assertion of a general principle, which was under-
stood to be of universal application in all free governments; a principle which
should be, and it is believed has been, applied in all the States of this Union, with-
out regard to the particular form of their constitution." Rich v. Flanders, 39 N.H.
304, 335 (1859); see also Concord R.R. v. Greely, 17 N.H. 47, 56 (1845) (holding
that an uncompensated taking of private property "would not be so much in repug-
nance to the constitution as it would be to the principles which hold human society
together"); Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 1 N.H. 111, 114 (1817),
(holding that the state legislature's power is limited "only by our constitutions and
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This universalist approach to state constitutional adjudication
was given a strong and lasting boost by Thomas Cooley as the re-
sult of the 1868 publication of his influential treatise, Constitu-
tional Limitations.93 Although prior treatises had been devoted to
the federal Constitution, Cooley's work was the first systematic
treatment of state constitutional law as a distinct subject. Some
sense of the content of this work may be gleaned simply by examin-
ing some of the chapter headings. There is a chapter, for example,
entitled "The Powers Which the Legislative Department May Ex-
ercise." 94 Another chapter sets out "The Circumstances Under
Which a Legislative Enactment May Be Declared Unconstitu-
tional."95 Another deals with "The Constitutional Protections to
Personal Liberty,"96 and others with "Religious Liberty"97 and
"The Power of Taxation."98 One of the most remarkable things
about the treatise, however, is that it is largely devoid of any dis-
cussion of, or even citation to, the actual constitutions or judicial
decisions of any state. This reveals much about what Cooley's im-
portant work purports to be. It is neither a survey nor a compara-
tive analysis; it is, rather, a discussion of "the" principles of state
constitutional law.
With this treatise, Cooley essentially invented-or certainly
formalized-the field of "state constitutional law." In his hands, it
was a distinctly anti-positivist invention. It treated its subject not
in the positivist sense of a body of particular commands issued by
the sovereign people of particular states, but in the universalist
sense of an undifferentiated body of general principles existing in-
by the fundamental principles of all government and the unalienable rights of
mankind") rev'd on other grounds, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518 (1819). The Rhode Is-
land Supreme Court also suggested the interchangeability of constitutional doc-
trine when it referred to the United States Constitution as "the great exemplar of
constitutional law." G. & D. Taylor & Co. v. R.G. & J.T. Place, 4 R.I. 324, 336
(1856). That court has continued to this day the practice of regarding the state and
federal constitutions as doctrinally identical in a wide variety of areas. See In re
House of Representatives, 575 A.2d 176 (R.I. 1990); Chang v. University of R.I.,
375 A.2d 925 (R.I. 1977).
93. Thomas M. Cooley, A Treatise on the Constitutional Limitations Which
Rest upon the Legislative Power of the States of the American Union (6th ed. 1890)
(1868).
94. Id. ch. V, at 102.
95. Id. ch. VII, at 192.
96. Id. ch. X, at 359.
97. Id. ch. XIII, at 571.
98. Id. ch. XIV, at 587.
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dependent of any particular constitution and available to courts
construing individual constitutions whenever useful to decision in
individual cases.99 This, incidentally, accounts for the irony in the
United States Supreme Court's refusal in Township of Pine Grove
v. Talcott to follow a Michigan Supreme Court opinion written by
Justice Cooley on the ground that it misconstrued the applicable
general principles of constitutional law. 100
The influence of Cooley's treatise long outlived Cooley himself,
who died in 1898. The eighth and last edition of Constitutional
Limitations was published in 1927, yet the treatise is still being
cited, frequently, to this day. A recently performed electronic
search for citations to Cooley's treatise within the last decade by
the United States Supreme Court turned up twelve citations, 10'
but all of these came in the course of historical discussions that
referred to Cooley for the purpose of examining how the law was
formerly understood.'0 2 The same search among state high courts
turned up 82 citations. The larger number is to be expected, but
the character of the citations differed markedly. Rather than cit-
ing to Cooley's treatise for historical background, most of these ci-
tations relied on Cooley directly as authority relevant to the
resolution of present legal issues.103 Thus, for state courts, Coo-
99. On the bench, Cooley carried on the work he began in the treatise. As a
Justice of the Michigan Supreme Court, Cooley became strongly associated with a
kind of conservative constitutional universalism oriented toward the common law.
For example, in a case arising under the Michigan Constitution's Due Process
Clause, Cooley wrote:
The truth is, the bills of rights in the American Constitution, have not
been drafted for the introduction of new law, but to secure old principles
against abrogation or violation. They are conservatory instruments
rather than reformatory; and they assume that the existing principles of
the common law are ample for the protection of individual rights, when
once incorporated in the fundamental law, and thus secured against
violation.
Weimar v. Bunbury, 30 Mich. 201, 214 (1874).
100. See Township of Pine Grove v. Talcott, 86 U.S. (19 Wall.) 677-78 (1873).
101. My search, performed in the Lexis database on May 5, 1998, was "Cooley
w/5 constitutional limitations and date aft 1987." I performed the search first in
the "genfed/UJS" file and then in the "states/highct" file.
102. See, e.g., City of Boerne v. Flores, 117 S. Ct. 2157, 2165 (1997) (turning to
Cooley to shed light on the early understanding of the meaning of the Fourteenth
Amendment); Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 211, 224 (1995) (citing Coo-
ley in the course of a discussion of the nineteenth century understanding of separa-
tion of powers in state courts).
103. See, e.g., Ex parte Southern Ry. Co., 556 So. 2d 1082, 1090 (Ala. 1989);
Ficarra v. Department of Regulatory Agencies, 849 P.2d 6, 16 (Colo. 1993); Gol-
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ley's treatise remains a living presence and important source of
doctrinal authority.
III. THE POSITIVIST REVOLUTION THAT WASN'T
The history and tradition of state constitutional universalism
puts contemporary debates about state constitutional law in a
rather different light. In many respects, the New Judicial Federal-
ism movement amounts to a call to positivism in state constitu-
tional law. Its proponents invite state courts to cease their
reflexive following of federal law and to depart from federal consti-
tutional doctrine, especially for the purpose of providing height-
ened protection of individual rights. Yet the supporters of New
Judicial Federalism invite state courts to do so not merely by an-
nouncing some disagreement with federal results, but by develop-
ing an independent state constitutional jurisprudence. And how
should state courts develop such an independent jurisprudence?
Proponents of the New Judicial Federalism are clear on this point:
state courts should develop an independent constitutional juris-
prudence by looking to the state constitution's text, history and
structure and the underlying values of the state polity that the
constitution reflects' 04-in other words, to the kinds of sources
that would be relevant under a positivist approach to constitu-
tional adjudication. New Judicial Federalism is thus, in a sense, a
call to complete the positivist revolution begun on the federal level
by replicating it on the state level.10 5
drush II v. City of Marietta, 482 S.E.2d 347, 360 (Ga. 1997); Michigan Bell Tel. Co.
v. Department of Treasury, 518 N.W.2d 808, 815 (Mich. 1994).
104. See, e.g., Hans A. Linde, E Pluribus - Constitutional Theory and State
Courts, 18 Ga. L. Rev. 165, 178-81 (1984); Hans A. Linde, First Things First: Redis-
covering the States' Bills of Rights, 9 U. Balt. L. Rev. 379, 380, 392 (1980); see also
State v. Hunt, 450 A.2d 952, 965-67 (N.J. 1982) (identifying standards to decide
whether to defer to the state constitution in protecting individual rights); Stewart
G. Pollock, State Constitutions as Separate Sources of Fundamental Rights, 35
Rutgers L. Rev. 707, 718 (1983) (arguing "[rleliance on state constitutions can bet-
ter reflect circumstances peculiar to a given state").
105. There is thick irony in the call of New Judicial Federalism to use state
constitutions to reach different results than has the United States Supreme Court,
but to do so by adopting the standard methodology of federal constitutional juris-
prudence. This would make state constitutional adjudication look more like its
federal counterpart in every way but in the results. This is no doubt why some see
the New Judicial Federalism as a fundamentally ideological, result-oriented move-
ment covered by a transparent methodological fig leaf. See, e.g., Earl M. Maltz,
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Yet the positivist revolution on the state level has gone badly.
Doctrinal convergence is still overwhelmingly the rule, and univer-
salist adjudicatory practices are still commonplace in state courts.
Why, if the positivist revolution has been so vigorous on the federal
level has it failed to catch fire in the states?
Former Oregon Supreme Court Justice Hans Linde, one of the
most consistent and forceful voices for positivism in state constitu-
tional adjudication, has argued that we should expect (and hope
for) just the opposite trend. Positivism, Linde claims, is the most
appropriate methodology for the interpretation of state constitu-
tions.' 0 6 The very multiplicity of state constitutions along with the
frequent obscurity and technicality of their substance, he argues,
prevents any kind of plausible appeal to fundamental or universal
norms.10 7 States have no mythological founders, according to
Linde, no distinctive characters or values, no "claim as a 'civil reli-
gion' or as the perfect embodiment of justice, when there are forty-
nine others."'08 In this environment, about the only resources to
which a judge can resort are the text and its legislative history-
the barebones materials of a positivist interpretive approach.
As I have argued elsewhere, this situation puts state courts in
a dilemma. They are required to interpret documents purporting
to be "constitutions," yet those documents lack the epic character
and unique, self-conscious polity typically understood to underlie
constitutions in the American tradition.' 0 9 Yet state courts have
not by and large chosen to resolve the dilemma as Linde proposes,
by turning to a text-based positivism. In fact, they have been
driven in exactly the opposite direction. Apparently feeling the
need for a shared social epic and a unique constituting polity, state
courts seem to have embraced the larger American narrative and
polity and appropriated them for the use of the state in state con-
stitutional adjudication. 110 Today, state courts show this in their
The Political Dynamic of the "New Judicial Federalism," in 2 Emerging Issues in
State Constitutional Law 233 (1989).
106. See Hans A. Linde, Are State Constitutions Common Law?, 34 Ariz. L.
Rev. 215, 228-29 (1992).
107. See Linde, E Pluribus, supra note 104, at 196-97.
108. Id. at 197 (citing Sanford Levinson, "The Constitution" in American Civil
Religion, 1979 Sup. Ct. Rev. 123).
109. See Gardner, supra note 2, at 812-32.
110. See James A. Gardner, Southern Character, Confederate Nationalism, and
the Interpretation of State Constitutions: A Case Study in Constitutional Argument,
76 Tex. L. Rev. 1219, 1260-82 (1998).
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persistent practice of indiscriminate pilfering from the constitu-
tional doctrine of the United States and sister states, and from the
common law. And this, in turn, has been easy for state courts to do
because it requires them to do nothing more than what they have
been doing for a long time. The indiscriminate appropriation of
constitutional doctrine from federal courts and from other states
and the common law-the use, that is, of universalist adjudicatory
practices-represents nothing more than a perfectly natural and
undoubtedly comfortable continuation of two centuries of unbroken
universalist assumptions and practices.
IV. UNIVERSALISM IN SEPARATION OF POWERS JURISPRUDENCE
In light of this history, the convergence of state and federal
separation of powers doctrine that I described earlier should come
as no surprise. Indeed, those inclined toward such an approach
can easily find natural law roots to the separation of powers doc-
trine that predate any American constitution. Locke and Montes-
quieu, for example, both speak in these terms, 1 ' and some
scholars have traced contemporary ideas about the separation of
powers to Aristotelian notions of mixed government. 112 As noted
earlier, some courts have taken exactly this approach, finding their
state constitutional principles of separation of powers to be derived
from venerable principles of natural law. 113
But constitutional universalism need not resort to natural law
to justify a universalist approach to separation of powers jurispru-
dence. James Madison is probably the theorist whose ideas most
directly shape American understandings of separation of powers.
Yet Madison did not derive the separation of powers from prior
principles of natural law; rather, he came to believe that the sepa-
ration of powers was a practical necessity because of certain char-
111. See John Locke, Second Treatise of Government paras. 3-4, 87-88, 128,
130-31, 145-48, 159 (Thomas P. Peardon ed., 1952) (1690); Baron De Montesquieu,
The Spirit of the Laws pt. 2, bk. 11, ch. 6, at 157 (Thomas Nugent trans., 1949)
(1748).
112. See M.J.C. Vile, Constitutionalism and the Separation of Powers ch. 2, at
21 (1967).
113. See Chiles v. Children A, B, C, D, E, and F, 589 So. 2d 260, 263-64 (Fla.
1991); Department of Transp. v. Armacost, 532 A.2d 1056, 1062 (Md. 1987). For a
firm embrace of a contrary, positivist approach, see Dye v. State, 507 So. 2d 332,
346 (Miss. 1987) ("[Tjhere is no natural law of separation of powers. Rather, the
powers of government are separate only insofar as the Constitution makes them
separate.").
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acteristics of human psychology and motivation that he believed to
be universal-namely, the tendency toward tyranny of those who
hold power sufficient to tyrannize.114 But even a universal human
psychology is unnecessary to support a universalist approach to
separation of powers jurisprudence: the mere fact of widespread
commonalities in structures and practices in all the states and the
federal government suggest an entirely pragmatic, but equally ser-
viceable basis for beginning from the assumption of doctrinal
congruence.
Where we see this tendency most starkly, of course, is not in
the theoretical analyses of scholars, but on the ground-in the
briefs and arguments of practicing lawyers. The Rhode Island
Supreme Court will soon decide the constitutionality of the legisla-
ture's practice of making appointments, including self-appoint-
ments, to state executive branch agencies. In his brief, the
Governor's counsel places himself in a long line of predecessors
who have argued that separation of powers principles under the
state and federal constitutions are identical. 115 The lengthy, un-
broken tradition of state constitutional universalism suggests at
the very least that we should not be surprised if the Rhode Island
Supreme Court agrees.
114. See The Federalist No. 47, at 301 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed.,
1961).
115. See Brief of Governor Lincoln C. Almond, In re Advisory Opinion to the
Governor (Separation of Powers) (No. 97-572-M.P.).

